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in that it is alleged that the court erroneously construed a legal 
agreement. 
5. Did the trial court err in requiring the Homeowners to 
allow Foothills to transport water through their system to 
customers outside of Hi-Country Estates Subdivision Phase I; and is 
this issue properly before the court on appeal? The standard of 
review is a legal correctness standard. 
6. Should the lower court's initial determination that title 
should be quieted in favor of Homeowners be upheld on appeal and 
the case remanded with instructions to enter a quiet title order in 
favor of Homeowners? This issue is a question of law and should be 
reviewed on a legal correctness standard. 
7. Does the record in the lower court support the District 
Court's judgment quieting title in favor of Foothills? Again, this 
should be reviewed from a legal correctness standard. 
8. Did the lower court err in dismissing Foothills' claims 
for slander of title? Since this involves questions of fact, the 
standard of review is a clearly erroneous standard. 
9. Should Bagleys have been entitled to recover from 
Homeowners amounts allegedly expended by Bagleys for capital 
improvements and losses incurred in operating the water system 
where they transferred and assigned all right, title and interest 
2 
in the water system to J. Rodney Dansie? The standard of review is 
a legal correctness standard. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Any relevant text of constitutional provisions, statutes, or 
rules pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on appeal 
is contained in the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an action to quiet title in a water system and water 
right brought by Appellant Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Associa-
tion (hereinafter "Homeowners"). On October 20, 1989, the 
Honorable Pat B. Brian, Third District Court, entered an "Order on 
Ownership Issues" in which he found among other things, "Plaintiff 
(Homeowners) is the legal owner of the disputed water system, which 
includes the water rights, the water lots, the water tanks and the 
water lines." 
Judge Brian also provided in that same Order for, "(A)n 
evidentiary hearing. . . to establish the amount of reimbursement 
due to Defendants Bagley & Company and/or Foothills Water Company 
for the reasonable value of improvements made by Defendant Bagley 
& Company." Furthermore, Judge Brian ordered: 
"An order quieting title to the water system, 
in the name of plaintiff, will issue only upon 
payment in full by plaintiff to defendant of 
the Court's Reimbursement Order for improve-
ments by the defendant to the plaintiff's 
water system for the years 1974 to 1985." 
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On August 16, 1990, Judge Brian ruled among other things, that 
a certain well lease agreement was a valid encumbrance upon the 
subject water system and required the Appellant Homeowners, who he 
found to be the owner of the water system, to permit Appellee J. 
Rodney Dansie's family to receive and transport free of charge, 
water through the subject system, in the amount of twelve million 
gallons per year or such larger amount as would be permitted by the 
excess capacity of the system as long as the system exists and is 
operative. 
The Court ordered Plaintiff and Appellant herein to pay to 
Foothills Water Company the sum of $98,500.00 before it would enter 
the Quiet Title Order to the water system and water right in favor 
of Appellant no later than August 15, 1991, with the unpaid balance 
being interest free. 
On February 5, 1991, the Court issued a ruling entitled "Order 
on Motions to Certify Order as Final and Clarification of Order". 
In this Order, Judge Brian amended his previous Order without 
formal motion in writing or on the record by any party, and 
provided that a Quiet Title Order would issue to Foothills if 
Homeowners failed to pay Foothills $98,500.00 by August 15, 1991. 
On August 20, 1991, after being notified by Foothills that the 
$98,500.00 had not been paid to them as provided, the Court issued 
a Quiet Title Order in favor of Foothills Water Company, despite 
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its previous ruling that the water system was legally owned by the 
Homeowners. 
Homeowners seeks reversal of the Court's issuance of the Quiet 
Title Order in the name of Foothills Water Company; and reversal of 
the determination of the Court that Appellant should have been 
required to pay the sum of $98,500.00 to Appellee Foothills Water 
Company as a condition precedent to being issued its own Quiet 
Title Order in the case. Homeowners seek an order from this Court 
requiring the trial court to issue a Quiet Title Order to the 
disputed property in its name, without the encumbrances contained 
in its final Order below. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On March 8, 1985, the Homeowners filed the instant action 
(R. 2-17). As the issues clarified, and additional procedural 
matters were considered by the parties and the Court, Homeowners 
subsequently (March 16, 1987) filed a Second Amended Complaint 
asking the Court to quiet title and/or issue a declaratory judgment 
declaring the rights and responsibilities of Homeowners with 
respect to ownership of the water system, and the real estate 
related thereto, which serves Hi-Country Estates Subdivision Phase 
I (R. 296-304). Homeowners also requested that liens filed against 
the system by Appellee J. Rodney Dansie be removed and declared 
null and void. 
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2. Appellees Bagley and Bagley & Company (hereinafter 
collectively "Bagley") answered the Second Amended Complaint on 
March 31, 1987, claiming that the Homeowners had not paid bills for 
water usage in their First Cause of Action; and claiming that if 
Appellant is found to be the owner of the water system, Bagley 
should be reimbursed for costs and expenses in the operation and 
maintenance of the system (R. 317-322). 
3. Appellees Foothills Water Company (hereinafter "Foot-
hills") and Dansie answered Homeowners1 Second Amended Complaint on 
March 21, 1987, and counterclaimed against Counter-Claim Defendants 
Sims and Turner for slander of title and against Homeowners to 
quiet title in the action in Foothills Water Company. Dansie and 
Foothills also filed a Cross-Claim against Defendants Spencer and 
Lewton for slander of title (R. 341-352). 
4. By stipulated Order dated June 11, 1987, the Honorable Pat 
B. Brian found that all parties necessary to the action were named 
in the Second Amended Complaint and Counterclaim (R. 365-367). 
5. Homeowners replied to the Dansie and Foothills Counter-
claims on July 9, 1987 (R. 371-373). 
6. Counterclaim Defendants Sims and Turner replied to 
Foothills and Dansiefs Counterclaim on July 9, 1987 (R. 374-377). 
Ultimately Foothills and Dansie abandoned their claim against Sims 
and Turner and this appeal does not concern them. 
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7. Defendants Spencer and Lewton answered Appellant's Second 
Amended Complaint and Foothills' Cross-Claim on July 13, 1987 (R. 
381-384)• In their answer, Defendants Spencer and Lewton claimed 
no interest in the property detailed in Plaintiff's Complaint and 
stated they had no contract or transaction with Foothills that 
would give rise to a cross-claim against them (R. 381-384). 
8. Charles E. Lewton and Keith Spencer, two of the original 
developers of Hi-Country Estates Subdivision Phase I, having chosen 
to disclaim their interest in any of the property involved, allowed 
judgment to be taken against them. (R. 897, 902, 904). The same 
was true of Defendants Hi-Country Estates, Inc., and Hi-Country 
Estates Second (R. 897, 902, 903). Defendant J. Rodney Dansie 
failed to appeal from any of the Court's Orders in this case. All 
unknown persons claiming an interest in Hi-Country Estates 
Subdivision were served pursuant to an Order Authorizing Service of 
Summons by Publication entered on March 23, 1987, by the Honorable 
David B. Dee (R. 312, 313). Proof of Publication was presented to 
the Court on or about May 1, 1987 (R. 340). Therefore, the only 
parties against whom title was not quieted in this case were 
Foothills Water Company, Gerald H. Bagley and Bagley & Company, who 
have cross-appealed in this matter. 
9. Trial began on August 25, 1988. On that date, the Court 
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entered a Minute Entry stating: 
"This matter comes on before the Court for 
trial, with appearances as shown above. The 
Plaintiff's and Defendants1 counsel meet with 
the Court in chambers, and opening remarks are 
therefore waived. Thereupon, the Plaintiff 
calls Marge Tempest and she is sworn and 
examined. The respective counsel then agreed 
to submit the matter via written proffer. The 
matter will be further argued on September 9, 
1988, at 1:00 p.m." (Emphasis supplied). 
(R. 452). 
10. The Court thereupon received from the parties a "Stipu-
lated Statement of Undisputed Facts and Disputed Contentions" (R. 
565-596, 1661-1866), proffers of the parties, and legal briefs. 
11. On October 25, 1988, the Court brought the parties 
together to announce its decision on the issue of ownership. (As 
of April 1, 1992, the transcript of this proceeding had not been 
transferred to the Supreme Court and made a part of the record in 
this appeal. However, on March 30, 1992, Plaintiff notified Judge 
Brian's reporter, Brad J. Young, of this oversight, since tran-
scripts of all proceedings have previously been ordered as part of 
the record by the parties. Mr. Young promised to transfer the 
missing transcript to the Supreme Court, but had not done so as of 
the date of this brief. However, Appellant's counsel is in 
possession of a copy of the transcript of the proceedings referred 
to on August 25, 1988, which is attached as Addendum 4 to this 
Brief, and refers to page numbers in said transcript in this brief). 
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12. Present counsel entered his appearance for Homeowners on 
August 18, 1989 (R. 864-865). 
13. The Court's decision of August 25, 1988, was embodied in 
an "Order on Ownership Issues" signed by Judge Brian on October 20, 
1989 (R. 895-898). At that time, the Court also signed Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law (R. 899-904). Appellant does not 
appeal from this Order or from these Findings of Facts or Conclu-
sions of Law, except to the extent a Quiet Title Order was made 
contingent upon the payment of money. 
14. Claiming they were denied due process in the trial of the 
matter (despite the fact they had stipulated to the procedure used 
by the Court), Dansie and Foothills moved the Court for an Order of 
Reconsideration on October 30, 1989, as well as filing a motion for 
a new trial and for amendment/modification of the Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Order entered October 20, 1989 (R. 906-908). 
15. On December 1, 1989, Homeowners filed a "Trial Brief and 
Motion for Summary Judgment on Valuation Issue", claiming that the 
Court was bound by the determination of the Public Service 
Commission of Utah as to the improvements to the subject water 
system between 1974 and 1985 (R. 1023-1043). 
16. The Court heard Dansie and Foothills' motions on December 
28, 1989, and issued an Order denying all motions and restating 
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that the "Order dated October 20, 1989 is the final Order of the 
Court" on ownership issues (R. 1166). 
17. On January 8, 1990, Foothills and Dansie filed a "Supple-
mental Motion for Reconsideration or for Amendment/Modification of 
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order", in which Appellees 
argued that the Court's previous "Order on Ownership Issues" dated 
October 20, 1989, should be amended to provide something different 
than a requirement for reimbursement by Appellant to Dansie and/or 
Bagley & Company for the value of improvements to the system made 
between 1974 and 1985, i.e. reimbursement for the entire cost of 
the system (R. 1169-1201). 
18. On January 17, 1990, the Court reiterated its prior Order 
for the third time in its "Order Re: Further Proceedings" by 
ruling: 
"1. The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law and Order entered by this Court on October 
20, 1989, which memorialize the Court's previ-
ous oral ruling on October 25, 1988, reflect 
the Court's current Order dealing with the 
issues expressly ruled upon therein. . ." 
(R. 1205-1210). 
19. By Minute Entry of January 31, 1990, Foothills and 
Dansie's Motion for Reconsideration, Motion for New Trial, and 
Motion to Amend Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order were 
denied for a second time (R. 1228). 
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20. In the same Minute Entry of January 31, 1990, the Court 
denied Appellant's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment on the 
valuation issue and scheduled a trial to "determine fair compensa-
tion" (R. 1228). 
21. Trial was held on the valuation issue on July 30, 31, and 
August 1, 1990 (R. 1358-1362; R. 1953-2404). 
22. On August 16, 1990, the Court issued its Memorandum 
Decision (R. 1538-1543), which was embodied in formal Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and "Order Regarding Amount Payable by 
Plaintiff for Subject Water System" dated October 31, 1990 (R. 
1620-1628). 
23. On September 10, 1990, Foothills and Dansie made a Motion 
to Certify Orders as Final, and for Stay Pending Appeal (R. 1557-
1559). Appellees Bagley also made a Motion to Certify the Court's 
Order as Final on September 21, 1990 (R. 1584-1585). 
24. Despite the fact that no certification of the Court's 
Order for appeal had been signed by the trial judge, Bagley and 
Foothills filed appeals with the Utah Supreme Court which ultimate-
ly were dismissed on June 19, 1991, without prejudice to the filing 
of a new appeal (R. 1893-Supreme Court No. 900447) and July 25, 
1991 (R. 1918-Supreme Court No. 910115). 
25. On October 31, 1990, the parties were notified that Judge 
Brian desired to have an "informal conference" with them regarding 
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Appellees' Motions to Certify Orders as Final with but a few hours 
notice. On October 31, 1990, at 11:30 a.m., the parties appeared 
expecting this "informal conference". 
26. At that time, and not on the record, despite a request 
for the matter to be on the record by the parties, Judge Brian 
granted the oral motion of Foothills and Bagley to amend its 
previous Order dated October 31, 1990, with a ruling that if 
Homeowners failed to pay the sum of $98,500.00 by August 15, 1991, 
an Order Quieting Title to the water system would be entered in the 
name of Foothills Water Company (R. 1647). 
27. On February 5, 1991, the trial judge signed the document 
entitled "Order on Motions to Certify Order as Final and Clarifica-
tion of Order" in which he ruled among other things: 
"If the sum of $98,500.00 required to be paid 
to Foothills Water Company in paragraph 3 of 
the Order Regarding Amount Payable by Plain-
tiff for subject water system, dated October 
31, 1990, is not paid in full to Foothills 
Water Company on or before August 15, 1991, an 
Order Quieting Title to the water system 
within the boundaries of Hi-Country Estates 
Subdivision Phase I and the water right repre-
sented by Application No. 33130 (59-1608) on 
file with the Utah State Department of Natural 
Resources, Division of Water Rights, and the 
Utah State Engineer's Office, in Foothills 
Water Company shall be entered forthwith." 
(R. 1647-1649). 
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28. On May 23, 1991, Homeowners filed a "Motion to Pay 
$98,500.00 into an Interest-Bearing Account Under Control of the 
Court" (R. 1870-1882). 
29. Foothills and Dansie opposed the Motion (R. 1883-1889). 
30. The Court granted Homeowners' Motion in a telephone 
conference on July 23, 1991 (R. 1895) (a transcript of which was 
stipulated to by the parties) (R. 1902-1907). However, despite 
Homeowners1 objections, the Court, during this same telephone 
conference, refused to enter an order indicating the $98,500.00 was 
to be returned to Homeowners if the Utah Supreme Court reversed the 
trial court's Quiet Title Order to be entered in Homeowners' name. 
31. Instead, the Court signed Foothills' "Order Regarding 
Payment of the Sum of $98,500.00 into an Interest-Bearing Account 
Under Control of the Court" which provided inter alia: 
"In the event an appeal of this matter is 
prosecuted through final resolution, such 
money shall continued to be held by the Court 
and the Court will consider on proper motion 
how to dispose of that money and whether any 
part or all of that money will be payable to 
Foothills or any other party as a result of 
damage claims, claims for unreimbursed costs 
or extraordinary expenses incurred as a result 
of Foothills' operation of the subject system 
during the pendency of the appeal of this 
matter, or any other claims with respect 
thereto." 
(R. 1914-1917 at 1916). 
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32. Homeowners found this to be an intolerable condition, and 
chose not to risk its money to be used to satisfy potential 
frivolous claims by Foothills in the event of an unsuccessful 
appeal. 
33. On August 16, 1991, Foothills filed a "Motion for Entry 
of Order Quieting Title in favor of Foothills Water Company" (R. 
1923). On August 20, 1991, Judge Brian issued his "Quiet Title 
Order in Favor of Foothills Water Company", finding that Homeowners 
had failed to pay the $98,500.00 on or before August 15, 1991, as 
required by his Order of October 31, 1990 (R. 1931-1936). 
34. On August 22, 1991, Homeowners filed its Notice of Appeal 
in this matter (R. 1944-46). 
35. Foothills filed its Notice of Cross-Appeal in this matter 
on September 18, 1991 (R. 1947-48). It is significant that 
Defendant J. Rodney Dansie does not appeal from any of the Court's 
Orders in this case (R. 1947-48). 
36. On September 18, 1991, Bagley & Company and Gerald H. 
Bagley filed a Notice of Appeal in this matter (R. 1950-51). 
l 
1
 Homeowners would ask this Court to note that the 36 
points in the above Statement of Facts were initially presented in 
its Appellant's Brief. Although Appellees Bagley and Foothills 
provided their own statement of facts, said statement of facts do 
not conflict with any of the numbered paragraphs in Homeowners' 
original statement of facts, but simply add additional facts that 
Homeowners had not deemed important enough to present or which will 
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RESPONSE TO APPELLEE FOOTHILLS WATER COMPANY'S 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
In its "Consolidated Initial Brief of Foothills Water 
Company," Foothills provides some additional facts to the Court 
with regard to this matter. Since Foothills is alleging in its 
Consolidated Initial Brief that the lower court's record supports 
its judgment quieting title in favor of Foothills, Homeowners wish 
to respond to Foothills' Statement of Facts as follows: 
1. The parties stipulated and agreed that Homeowners is a 
Utah corporation in good standing and that its "shareholders" or 
"members" are owners of lots within the Subdivision in the 
southwestern part of Salt Lake County known as Hi-Country Estates, 
Phase I (the "Subdivision") (R.567). 
2. Defendant Bagley & Company is not, in fact, a Utah 
corporation. It was at one time a general partnership and now is 
simply a name used to identify Dr. Gerald Bagley's collective 
enterprises. Likewise, the name "Bagley Enterprises" has been used 
to identify Dr. Bagley's collective enterprises (R.568). 
3. The Subdivision plat contains an "Owners Dedication," 
be commented upon infra. Therefore, it is significant for the 
Court to note that the 36 paragraphs in Homeowners' initial 
Statement of Facts has not been disputed nor objected to by either 
Appellee in this matter, and therefore may be taken as true by this 
Court. 
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which provides in relevant part as follows: 
Know all men by these presents that we, the 
three undersigned owners of the hereon 
described tract of land, having caused same to 
be subdivided into lots, rights-of-way and 
streets to be hereafter known as Hi-Country 
Estates, a Subdivision, do hereby dedicate for 
perpetual use of the lot owners herein all 
parcels of land shown on this plat as intended 
for use as road right-of-way and bridle paths 
except those parcels of land shown on this 
plat as intended for public use. Use of lots 
shall be subject to the Hi-Country Estates 
Protective Covenants. 
We do also hereby dedicate for the perpetual 
use of the public all parcels of land shown in 
parcel "A" as intended for public use. 
(R.571). 
4. While Foothills and Bagleys argue that Mr. Spencer and Mr. 
Lewton entered into two agreements with Dr. Bagley by which certain 
property was sold by Hi-Country Estates II to Bagley, Homeowners 
dispute the 1974 agreement and contest its authenticity believing 
that the document has been altered (R.1750-1758). Stipulated 
Exhibit HHH is a report of Grant J. Throckmorton, a judicially 
recognized disputed documents examiner in the State of Utah 
(Addendum 1). Mr. Throckmorton in his examination points out 
numerous suspicious circumstances surrounding the copy of the 
aforementioned document offered as an exhibit by Foothills. Such 
suspicious conditions include, but are not limited to the 
following: The critical sentence conveying the water system to 
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Defendants was typed at a different time than the rest of the 
document; four or five different typewriters were used on the 
single document; pages were copied and/or reduced on different 
copiers and several insertions and additions have been made to the 
document. The number and significance of the changes to the 
document render it unacceptable and inadmissible as a copy (R.574). 
5. The parties stipulated in the lower court in the 
"Stipulated Statement of Undisputed Facts and Disputed Contentions" 
that "[I]n 1975, all ownership and assets, if any, of Hi-Country 
Estates Water Company were transferred to Dr. Bagley." In 
Foothills' Statement of Facts, Foothills leaves out the stipulated 
words ". . .if any. . .". Homeowners dispute the question as to 
whether or not any ownership and assets were transferred to Dr. 
Bagley in 1975 (R.574). 
6. While Homeowners agree that Dr. Bagley entered into a well 
lease and water transportation agreement in 1977 with Jesse Dansie 
and used the well lease thereby, that well lease agreement expired 
by its own terms on April 10, 1987, although Bagley did have the 
right to renew the well lease on that date on terms to be agreed to 
by Bagley and Dansie (R.1857-1867, at 1858). 
7. Although Foothills and Bagleys claim that one Dee 
Halverson appeared at the Assessor's Office and paid delinquent 
taxes on behalf of Bagleys, a document entitled "Temporary Receipt 
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No. 242" was found in the official records of the Salt Lake County 
Treasurer. That document indicates the taxes were "received of Hi-
Country Estates Homeowners Assn." (R.579). 
8. The County issued a tax deed in the name of the Homeowners 
Association to the two water tank lots in dispute as part of the 
water system in this case (R.579, 580). 
9. Although it is true that attorney Robert A. Bentley, 
former attorney for Homeowners, entered into the previously 
mentioned "Stipulated Statement of Undisputed Facts and Disputed 
Contentions" which contained stipulated fact no. 79 stating, "The 
Homeowners Association has never paid any amount to anyone to 
expressly purchase the water system or the Glazier Well water 
right" (emphasis supplied), Mr. Bentley also made clear on behalf 
of the Homeowners in that very same document, that among the 
disputed facts was the position taken by Homeowners that " [T]he 
Homeowners paid valuable consideration for their interest in the 
water system and the deed supporting that ownership through their 
lot purchases, maintenance on the system, and payment of property 
taxes" (R.588). Therefore, the stipulated fact referred to by 
Foothills in its brief must be viewed in light of the disputed fact 
mentioned above. 
10. Although it is true that the claim of the Homeowners to 
the water system complicated matters before the Public Service 
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Commission in proceedings in January of 1986 (R.583, Appellant's 
Foothills Consolidated Brief, p.18), the Public Service Commission 
also made a specific finding as follows: 
We find that all improvements to Foothills 
prior to 1981 are not includable in rate base 
because: 
a. Bagley was selling lots at a profit until 
1976. 
b. The improvements made between 1977 and 
1980 were to have been provided by Bagley as 
part of the original system. For improvements 
made from 1981-1985, we find as follows: 
1981: The pressure valve by lot no. 16 
and the new air and vacuum valve and 
check valve on booster station are 
allowable in rate base. . . 
1982: The new controls for tank no. 2 
and new relay on booster station are 
allowable in rate base. . . 
1983: No costs allowable for rate base. 
The 75 H.P. motor becomes Jesse Dansie's 
property by the terms of the well lease 
agreement. Insofar as the replacement 
of the 600 foot section of main is 
concerned, we find that Applicant failed 
to demonstrate that the costs involved 
in making that repair were just and 
reasonable and that there is a valid 
dispute as to the ownership of the main. 
In addition, Bagley would have been 
responsible to assure that the main was 
in good condition before the system 
would have been accepted by the 
Conservancy District. 
1984: No improvements. 
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1985: The replacement of booster pump, 
starter control panel, new tank overflow 
control valves, six-inch metering 
station and 1%-inch metering station are 
allowable in rate base. The check valve 
for the deep well is not allowable 
because it becomes Jesse Dansie's 
property by the terms of the well lease 
agreement... 
Thus, Applicants' total allowable rate base is 
$16,334.99. 
(R.1058-1059). 
11. Prior to 1987, a survey was performed which disputed the 
original survey of the Subdivision and indicated that access to the 
main water tank located in Lot 67 was not possible without 
traversing property owned by Gary A. and Carol W. Buhler, and that 
the original tank was bisected by the property lines and sat in 
part upon property owned by the Buhlers. On or about June 12, 
1987, the Buhlers quit-claimed to the Homeowners Association a 
described portion of Lot 67, with the intention of giving to the 
Association title to the ground upon which, according to the new 





THE FAILURE OF THE LOWER COURT TO MAKE SUPPORTING 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW IS FATAL 
TO ITS QUIET TITLE ORDER IN FAVOR OF FOOTHILLS. 
Rule 52 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides as 
follows: 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the 
facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, 
the court shall find the facts specially and 
state separately its conclusions of law 
thereon, and judgment shall be entered 
pursuant to Rule 58A; in granting or refusing 
interlocutory injunctions the court shall 
similarly set forth the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law which constitute the 
grounds of its action. Requests for findings 
are not necessary for purposes of review. 
Findings of fact, whether based on oral or 
documentary evidence, shall not be set aside 
unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall 
be given to the opportunity of the trial court 
to judge the credibility of the witnesses. 
The findings of a master, to the extent that 
the court adopts them, shall be considered as 
the findings of the court. It will be 
sufficient if the findings of fact and 
conclusions of law are stated orally and 
recorded in open court following the close of 
the evidence or appear in an opinion or 
memorandum of decision filed by the court. 
The trial court need not enter findings of 
fact and conclusions of law in rulings on 
motions, except as provided in Rule 41(b). 
The court shall, however, issue a brief 
written statement of the ground for its 
decision on all motions granted under Rules 
12(b), 50(a) and (b), 56, and 59 when the 
motion is based on more than one ground. 
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(b) Amendment. Upon motion of a party made 
not later than 10 days after entry of judgment 
the court may amend its findings or make 
additional findings and may amend the judgment 
accordingly. The motion may be made with a 
motion for a new trial pursuant to Rule 59. 
When findings of fact are made in actions 
tried by the court without a jury, the 
question of the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the findings may thereafter be raised 
whether or not the party raising the question 
has made in the district court an objection to 
such findings or has made either a motion to 
amend them, a motion for judgment, or a motion 
for a new trial. 
(c) Waiver of findings of fact and 
conclusions of law. Except in actions for 
divorce, findings of fact and conclusions of 
law may be waived by the parties to an issue 
of fact: 
(1) by default or by failing to appear 
at the trial; 
(2) by consent in writing, filed in the 
cause; 
(3) by oral consent in open court, 
entered in the minutes. 
(Amended effective Jan.l, 1987.) 
The seminal Utah case construing Rule 52 in the context of the 
instant matter is Anderson v. Utah County Board of County 
Commissioners, 589 P.2d 1214 (Utah 1979). In that case, the Utah 
Supreme Court clearly held that, with certain exceptions not 
applicable to the instant matter, Rule 52(a) URCP " . . . must be 
complied with and a judgment cannot stand unless there are findings 
which will justify it." The Anderson court cited the earlier case 
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of LeGrand Johnson Corporation v. Peterson, 18 Utah.2d 260, 420 
P.2d 615 (1966) and cases therein cited. 
In LeGrand Johnson Corporation v. Peterson, the Utah Supreme 
Court reviewed a case where a trial court failed to make findings 
of fact in denying relief to a plaintiff who sought to enforce an 
alleged agreement to convey an interest in certain mining property 
and to recover money advanced to defendants. Justice Crockett, 
writing for a unanimous court, made the following comments in 
issuing the ruling of the court: 
We are at a loss to understand why no findings 
of fact were made in the instant case. The 
right to resort to the courts for the 
adjudication of grievances and the settlement 
of disputes is a fundamental and important 
one. (Citing Article I, Section 11, Utah 
Constitution, and Barnhart v. Civil Service 
Employees Insurance Co., 16 Utah.2d 223, 398 
P.2d 873 (1965)). An indispensable requisite 
to fulfilling that responsibility is the 
determination of questions of fact upon which 
there is disagreement. It is for this reason 
that our rules impose the duty of making 
findings on all material issues. . . In Baker 
v. Hatch, 70 Utah 1, 9, 257 P. 673, 676, the 
court declared: 
%It is the duty of the trial court to 
find upon all material issues raised by 
the pleadings, and the failure to do so 
is reversible error. (Citing 
authorities) (Emphasis supplied). . .' 
420 P.2d at 616. 
See also, Gaddis Investment Company v. Morrison, 278 P.2d 284 
(1954); Hall v. Sabey, 58 Utah 343, 198 P. 1110; Prows v. Hawley, 
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72 Utah 444, 271 P. 31; Simper v. Brown, 74 Utah 178, 278 P. 529; 
West v. Standard Fuel Co., 81 Utah 300, 17 P.2d 292; Pike v. Clark, 
95 Utah 235, 79 P.2d 1010. 
It should be dispositive of this issue for the Court to note 
that in the Consolidated Initial Brief of Foothills Water Company, 
Appellee Foothills proclaims: "Admittedly, the district court's 
findings do not support its ultimate judgment." (Cons. In. Br. of 
Foothills W.C. at 27. This admission alone should be sufficient 
pursuant to the case authority cited under this Point for the Court 
to reverse the quiet title order entered in favor of Foothills 
Water Company and remand the case to the lower court for either 
appropriate judgment in favor of Homeowners (which is supported by 
all of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, memoranda and oral 
opinions of the Court); or additional proceedings as the court 
deems appropriate. 
Although they admit the district court findings do not support 
its judgment of quiet title in Foothills1 favor, Foothills' counsel 
argues in its Consolidated Initial Brief that the district court 
purported to resolve all fact issues related to ownership of the 
water system and water right based upon a written stipulation and 
written proffers, and that being the case, this appellate court is 
in as good a position as was the district court to resolve those 
issues. (Cons. In. Br. of Foothills W.C. at p. 27). 
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Foothills cites the case of Hamby v. Johnson,, 769 P.2d at 278 
to support this proposition. However, Hamby is a divorce case 
decided by the Utah Court of Appeals in 1989. A close reading of 
the case finds no support whatsoever for the proposition alleged by 
Foothills. However, on the page cited by Foothills, page 278, the 
court notes that " . . . [B]oth parties stipulated to proffers of 
testimony in front of Judge Harding, who encouraged the stipulation 
by his remark that the principle issue was a question of law, not 
fact. This was error, as the only legal issue before the court was 
the appropriate test to apply in the matter. . ." While the court 
does cite a previous Utah Court of Appeals case to the effect that 
an appellate court is ". . .in as good a position to review the 
proffer as was the trial court. . .", the court was also basing its 
decision on findings of fact supporting its judgment made by the 
lower court. In the instant case, we have no findings of fact or 
conclusions of law which support the judgment of the lower court, 
and it would be a great injustice for this court to attempt to 
substitute its judgment for that of the lower court, whether the 
proof was presented to the lower court by proffers or otherwise, 
under these circumstances. 
Furthermore, Foothills cites the case of Bill Nay & Sons 
Excavating v. Neeley Construction Co., 677 P.2d 1120 (Utah 1984) 
for the proposition that a trial court's decision should be 
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affirmed when it can be done so on a proper ground, even though it 
was not the ground on which the trial court relied in its ruling. 
While Foothills states the proposition accurately as presented in 
the Nay case, the Supreme Court also clearly stated: ,f[W]hile 
there was an evidentiary basis for such a finding and this Court 
can make its own findings in an equity case, we normally refrain 
from doing so." 677 P.2d at 1123. 
In the Nay case, there was a clear alternative legal basis for 
sustaining the trial court's decision as a matter of law, even 
though the court had failed to make a finding of fact on the 
specific type of fraud perpetrated in that case. Homeowners submit 
that the instant case is not a proper case for that kind of 
substitution as a matter of law by this reviewing Court. This is 
particularly true where absolutely no findings of fact or 
conclusions of law supporting the quiet title order in favor of 
Foothills were entered by the lower court. Rather than just trying 
to fill in an alternative legal theory which would support the 
lower court's judgment as did the Supreme Court in the Nay case, 
the appellate court in this instance would be required to make a 
whole series of findings of fact and conclusions of law to support 
the lower court's quiet title order. 
Homeowners presented the clear proposition in its opening 
brief at pages 28 and 29 that Utah case law mandates in an action 
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to quiet title, a plaintiff must succeed by virtue of the strength 
of his own title rather than the weakness of the defendant's title. 
Homeowners made the statement in its opening brief that counsel had 
been unable to find a single case of any kind which would support 
the remedy fashioned by the trial judge in the instant case; that 
is, findings of fact and conclusions of law which support a quiet 
title order in favor of Plaintiff, but involving a quiet title 
order issued in favor of Defendant because Plaintiff failed to pay 
a sum of money to obtain its quiet title order. Homeowners 
challenged Foothills or Bagley to present case authority for the 
remedy fashioned by the trial judge, but this challenge was not 
answered in either the Consolidated Initial Brief of Foothills 
Water Company, or Appellants Bagleys' Consolidated Initial Brief on 
its Cross Appeal and Opposing Brief on the Appeal of the 
Association. Neither Appellee bothered to make any reference 
whatsoever to Homeowners' conclusion that no case law exists which 
supports the lower court's judgment in this matter. Therefore, 
Homeowners believe that the judgment of the trial court should be 
reversed as a matter of law. 
It should be noted in addition, that when the quiet title 
order was finally issued in favor of Foothills Water Company based 
upon the failure of Homeowners to pay the sum of $98,500.00 
(R.1931-1936), neither Foothills nor Bagleys chose to move the 
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court for an amendment to its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of 
Law pursuant to the provisions of Rule 52(b), in an effort to 
create findings and conclusions which would support the quiet title 
order of the court. It is inappropriate for Foothills to now 
argue, as they do in their Initial Consolidated Brief, that despite 
the lack of findings of fact and conclusions of law to support the 
quiet title order in their favor, this appellate court should now 
jump in and decide all of the facts and make all of the legal 
conclusions necessary to support the lower court's judgment. 
(Cons. In. Br. of Foothills W.C. at pp. 25-34). 
Foothills also makes the untrue and misleading argument that 
it was the only one that submitted proffers of evidence with regard 
to the disputed issues of fact in the case. Foothills then argues 
that because Homeowners did not submit proffers, the court should 
have simply ruled in Foothills1 favor automatically. (Cons. In. 
Br. of Foothills W.C. at pp. 25, 26). Despite this request of the 
court, Foothills admits that "... [W]ith some effort the parties 
did arrive at a stipulated statement of facts which were not in 
dispute, together with a list of fact issues as to which the 
parties could not agree. That document appears at pages 565-596 of 
the record herein. . .". 
The fallacy of Foothills' argument is that the court had the 
clear ability to decide, based upon the stipulated statement of 
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facts, that a quiet title order should be issued in favor of 
Homeowners. In fact, the court used just this procedure when it 
announced Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law in favor of 
Homeowners in the following ways: 
1. In its oral comments on October 25, 1988 (not yet 
transferred by reporter Brad Young, see p. 8 this brief and add. 
4); 
2. In its Order on Ownership Issues signed by Judge 
Brian on October 20, 1989, embodying the oral decision announced 
October 25, 1988 (R.895-898); 
3. In its Minute Entry of December 28, 1989 (R.1166); 
4. In its January 17, 1990 Order Re: Further Proceedings 
(R.1205-1210); 
5. In its Minute Entry of January 31, 1990 (R.1228); 
6. In its Memorandum Decision on August 16, 1990 
(R.1538-1543). 
Although it is true that Rule 52 URCP allows findings of fact 
and conclusions of law to be stated orally, recorded in open court 
following the close of evidence, or appear in an opinion or 
memorandum of decision filed by the court even though not embodied 
in formal findings and conclusions, all of the minute entries, oral 
opinions and orders entered by the court found the facts and 
conclusions of law in favor of Homeowners. Such findings and 
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conclusions were appropriate in light of the fact that both 
Appellees in this case stipulated and agreed to facts which lead to 
the court's judgment. The alleged "undisputed evidence" referred 
to by Foothills in their Consolidated Initial Brief is actually 
evidence disputed by the very stipulation they entered into with 
regard to the facts of the case (R.565-596). 
It is illogical for Foothills to argue that the mere fact that 
it submitted certain proffers, and other parties did not submit 
proffers, means that the court should automatically have accepted 
the proffers as true (despite all other facts in the case, 
including stipulated facts), and therefore the Court should have 
automatically issued judgment in favor of the party submitting the 
proffers. This position simply cannot be accepted by this Court as 
a basis upon which to substitute its judgment for that of the trial 
court with regard to findings of fact and conclusions of law in 
this matter. 
POINT II 
THE RECORD IS REPLETE WITH DISPUTED FACTS, 
AND FOOTHILLS1 ASSERTION THAT THE RECORD 
SUPPORTS THE COURT'S JUDGMENT IS ERRONEOUS. 
Despite Foothill's argument that its proffers should be viewed 
by this appellate court as "uncontroverted", Homeowners maintain 
that the record contains numerous facts, many stipulated to by 
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Foothills and Bagleys, which supported the court's initial judgment 
that a quiet title order should be issued in favor of Homeowners. 
Foothills claims in its Initial Consolidated Brief that the 
instruments relied upon by Homeowners are ineffective because they 
were obtained for no value and with full knowledge of the claim of 
Foothills and its predecessors. To some extent, Bagleys make this 
same argument. This argument however, completely overlooks the 
record evidence cited by Homeowners in their opening brief at pages 
15-22; and 42-47. The evidence is clear, and it may be presumed 
that Judge Brian originally agreed, that Homeowners had indeed 
obtained the water system and the water right for value. The value 
provided was from the proceeds paid to Bagley and his partners for 
the initial sale of the lots in the subdivision. Homeowners quoted 
extensively from the deposition testimony of Appellee Gerald H. 
Bagley in which Dr. Bagley had indicated that he had recovered the 
cost of the water system through the price established for the sale 
of the lots (H.O. Op. Br. at 17, 18). Furthermore, in his 
deposition, Charles Lewton, one of the original developers and a 
principal in Hi-Country Estates, Inc., testified that the reason 
the Homeowners Association was created by the developers originally 
was so that they could take over the "amenities" that would service 
all of the lot owners. When asked what types of amenities he was 
referring to, Mr. Lewton included the roads, the gate and the water 
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system. He further stated that it was the intention of the 
developers all along either to turn the water system over to the 
Homeowners Association or the Salt Lake City (sic County) 
Conservancy (District). (H.O. Op. Br. at 21, 22). 
Even though proffers of another of the original developers, 
Keith Spencer, seemed to contradict Mr. Lewton's testimony, the 
court obviously resolved that issue of fact in favor of the 
Homeowners (R.895-898). 
It should be noted that in its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law dated October 20, 1989 (R.895-898), the lower 
court adopted and incorporated by reference as its own findings of 
fact the parties' Stipulated Statement of Undisputed Facts dated 
September 16, 1988, paragraphs 1 through 89 inclusive. From these 
undisputed facts stipulated to by the parties, the court concluded 
the following: 
1. Hi-Country Estates, Inc., held right, title and 
interest in the disputed water system (R.569, 572, 573, 576, 581, 
and 582). 
2. The 1974 agreement between Hi-Country Estates Second 
and Bagley & Company was only an agreement to convey right, title 
and interest in the disputed water system, and did not constitute 
a deed or legal document of conveyance (R.574, Ex. NN-R 1750-1759). 
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3. Homeowners had obtained legal right, title and 
interest in the disputed water system from two 1975 quit claim 
deeds issued by Hi-Country Estates, Inc. and Hi-Country Estates 
Second (R.576); a 1984 recorded tax deed from Salt Lake County to 
Homeowners conveying all the water tank lots in the disputed 
subdivision to Homeowners (R.577-580); a 1985 deed from Hi-Country 
Estates, Inc. to Plaintiff conveying the water tank lots to 
Homeowners (R.581, 582); two 1985 recorded quit claim deeds from 
Zions Bank and Trust conveying the water tank lots to Homeowners 
(R.581); an assignment from Hi-Country Estates, Inc. to Homeowners 
of the disputed water right (R.582); an acknowledgement by the 
State Engineer's Division of Water Rights that the Homeowners are 
the owner of the disputed water right in this case (the Glazier 
well water right) (R.581, 585). 
Due to these facts, the allegation by both Appellees in their 
briefs that the court had no evidentiary basis upon which to decide 
the ownership issue is inaccurate and misleading. The court 
resolved these critical issues of fact in favor of Homeowners; yet 
Foothills' argument is simply that the failure of Homeowners to 
provide proffers as Foothills did means that the case should have 
necessarily been resolved in favor of Foothills. This conclusion 
is simply not logical and not supported by the evidence considered 
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by the lower court in creating its Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law in this case. 
Homeowners believe it is significant that the burden Foothills 
and Bagleys must meet in order to convince this Court that the 
record in this case supports the district court's judgment quieting 
title in favor of Foothills, is to show that the Findings of Fact 
were clearly erroneous; especially since the Findings did not 
support the judgment in this case. Foothills simply argues that it 
raised factual questions which were resolved against it, but the 
lower court was wrong in doing so. They clearly have not met the 
burden of establishing that the lower court's Findings were 
"clearly erroneous." Rule 52(a); Bellon v. Malnar, 808 P.2d 1089, 
1092 (Utah 1991). 
POINT III 
APPELLEES HAVE FAILED TO PRESENT ARGUMENTS OR 
AUTHORITY JUSTIFYING THE LOWER COURT'S DECISION 
THAT HOMEOWNERS SHOULD HAVE A QUIET TITLE ORDER, 
BUT ONLY IF THEY PAY FOOTHILLS $98,500.00. 
In its opening brief, Homeowners argued that in an action to 
quiet title, where it proved that it was entitled to possession and 
that legal title vested in it, the law would presume that it was in 
constructive possession and, in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary, it was entitled to actual possession. Gibson v. 
McGurrin, 37 Utah 158, 106 P. 669 (Utah 1910). Furthermore, 
Homeowners argued that the Utah Supreme Court has held consistently 
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that in an action to quiet title, a plaintiff must succeed by 
virtue of the strength of his own title (H.O. Op- Br. at 28); and 
that it seemed arbitrary, capricious, unjust and unfair for the 
trial court to have ruled that Homeowners are the legal owner of 
the water system and water right based upon the strength of its 
title, but then rule that despite its inferior claim to title, a 
quiet title order would be issued in the name of Foothills if 
Homeowners didn't pay Foothills $98,500.00- Foothills' only 
response to this argument was that the Homeowners would be unjustly 
enriched if they were given a quiet title order without first 
paying money. Although they make this argument on pages 22 and 23 
of their Consolidated Initial Brief, they failed to respond to 
Homeowners' challenge to cite a case or statute allowing such a 
contingent quiet title order to be issued. Counterclaims or 
setoffs could be dealt with by the issuance of a lien. Ordering 
quiet title in one not entitled to such an order is an 
inappropriate remedy at law for failure to pay sums owing to 
another. Homeowners suggest that Appellees have failed to present 
appropriate arguments or authority justifying this decision by the 
lower court, and request that the judgment be reversed and the case 
remanded to the lower court with instructions to enter a quiet 
title order in favor of Homeowners. 
POINT IV 
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PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION ORDERS REGARDING THE 
VALUATION OF THE WATER SYSTEM SHOULD HAVE BEEN 
ADOPTED BY THE TRIAL COURT, 
In its opening brief, Homeowners argued that the lower court 
should have granted summary judgment on the valuation issue based 
upon a determination of the subject by the Public Service 
Commission in the case entitled In the Matter of the Application of 
Foothills Water Company, Inc. for a Certificate of Convenience and 
Necessity to Operate as a Public Utility, Case No. 85-2010-01 
before the Public Service Commission of Utah dated March 17, 1986 
(R.1044-1094). Appellant quotes extensively from that decision on 
pages 30-40 of its opening brief. 
Foothills1 response to this argument was simply that the 
Public Service Commission did not attempt to determine the value of 
the water system or any improvements to it. Foothills suggests 
that the Homeowners' position erroneously assumes that cost and 
value are identical. Furthermore, Foothills argues that U.C.A. 
§ 54-4-21 statutorily empowers the Public Service Commission to 
value utility company assets exclusively "for the purpose of 
setting rates". Foothills suggests that Homeowners have cited no 
authority in their opening brief for the proposition that the 
Public Service Commission has exclusive jurisdiction to determine 
the value of utility company assets, and that the district court 
should therefore have requested such a determination from the 
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Commission, or entered summary judgment based upon the Commission's 
March 17, 1986 Order (Cons. In. Br. of Foothills W.C., pp. 39-42). 
Appellants Bagleys in their Consolidated Initial Brief make 
essentially the same argument at page 15. 
Appellees would have the Court ignore the clear language of 
U.C.A. § 54-4-21 (Valuation of public utilities) which states as 
follows: 
The commission shall have power to ascertain 
the value of the property of every public 
utility in this state and every fact which in 
its judgment may or does have any bearing on 
such value. The commission shall have power 
to make revaluations from time to time and to 
ascertain the value of new construction, 
extensions, and additions to the property of 
every public utility ; provided, that the 
valuation of the property of all public 
utilities doing business within this state 
located in Utah as recorded in accordance with 
Section 54-4-22 of this chapter shall be 
considered the actual value of the properties 
of said public utilities in Utah unless 
otherwise changed after hearings by order of 
the commission. In case the commission 
changes the valuation of the properties of any 
public utility said new valuations found by 
the commission shall be the valuations of said 
public utility for all purposes provided in 
this chapter. (Emphasis supplied). 
As can be seen, this statute does not give the Public Service 
Commission exclusive authority to ascertain the value of property 
for rate making purposes only, but purports to provide such 
authority to the Public Service Commission for valuing all assets 
of a public utility for all purposes. As a matter of fact, the 
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Utah Supreme Court has construed this statute precisely the way 
Homeowners have asked this Court to construe it. 
In the case of Utah Power & Light Company v. Public Service 
Commission, 122 Utah 284, 249 P.2d 951 (1952), Chief Justice Wolfe, 
in a unanimous opinion (with a concurring opinion by Justice Hoyt) 
construing the forerunner of U.C.A. § 54-4-21 which was U.C.A. 
§ 76-4-21), considered an argument by Utah Power and Light Company 
that the only purpose of the statute was to find the value of 
public utilities and use that value as a base for determining just 
and reasonable rates. The Court reviewed the company's contention 
that the language of this statute (and other associated statutes) 
showed a legislative intent to have rates based upon value; and 
therefore if "cost" was to be used in place of "value", there would 
be no necessity for or meaning to the language requiring 
revaluations from time to time. The Supreme Court, in responding 
to this argument, held: 
We believe that these two statutes, even when 
lifted from the Act and considered by 
themselves, show that the legislature 
contemplated that there would be situations 
under which various departments of the state 
would find it necessary to know or to prove 
the value of a public utility. This is 
evidenced by the provision that the findings 
of value, when properly made, would be 
admissible in evidence in the various named 
proceedings in which the departments of the 
state or various bodies politic might be 
interested. This language indicates that 
these sections (76-4-21 and 76-6-19) were not 
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designed to require the commission to find 
value for rate making purposes. Since the 
valuation findings were by statute made 
admissible in evidence in various types of 
proceedings and were to be conclusive in 
absence of a showing of changed conditions, 
etc., it is only logical that the statute 
would provide a procedure for reevaluations 
from time to time to keep the valuation 
abreast of changing conditions. 
There is nothing in section 76-4-21 which 
requires that it be construed as a mandate to 
the commission to base rates on value rate 
base . . . these sections contain no mandate 
that rates be based on a fair value rate 
base . . . (Emphasis supplied). 
152 P.2d at 554, 555. 
The Supreme Court went on to discuss a case cited by the 
Company from Pennsylvania used as a precedent for the proposition 
that Utah's valuation section (76-4-21) must be construed as a 
mandate for the commission to bottom rates upon a value rate base. 
The Supreme Court clearly distinguished the Pennsylvania case on 
the basis that the equivalent of the valuation statute in 
Pennsylvania was expressly limited to valuation for purposes of 
"rates and rate making." The Supreme Court held that Utah's 
valuation statute was not limited to valuation for the purposes of 
rate making as was Pennsylvania's. 152 P.2d at 555, 556. 
Therefore, it continues to be the position of Homeowners that 
U.C.A. § 54-7-19 (as amended 1987) makes clear that the findings of 
the Public Service Commission are conclusive evidence of the value 
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of public utilities in any hearing before "any court." The 
arguments made by Appellees in their briefs therefore are erroneous 
and should be rejected by this Court. Homeowners continue to 
believe that the very least the trial court should have done was to 
submit this matter to the Public Service Commission for a 
determination of the value of assets of Foothills Water Company, 
but only if it were not willing to accept the value established by 
the Public Service Commission in its Order of March 17, 1986 for 
the years between 1974 and 1985, which was the focus of Judge 
Brian's Order on Ownership Issues. Paragraph 3 of that order 
stated, "An order quieting title to the water system, in the name 
of plaintiff (Homeowners) will issue only upon payment in full by 
plaintiff to defendant of the court's reimbursement order for 
improvements by the defendant to the plaintiff's water system for 
the years 1974 to 1985" (R.897). 
POINT V 
APPELLEES HAVE FAILED TO SUBSTANTIVELY RESPOND TO 
HOMEOWNERS' ARGUMENT THAT THE COURT'S ORIGINAL 
DECISION TO QUIET TITLE IN HOMEOWNERS, BUT SUBJECT 
TO THE 1977 WELL LEASE AGREEMENT AND CONTINUED 
TRANSPORTATION OF WATER THROUGH THE SYSTEM BY 
FOOTHILLS, WAS ERRONEOUS. 
In its opening brief, Homeowners argued that the lower court's 
initial decision to enter a quiet title order in its favor, but 
subject to the 1977 Well Lease Agreement between Gerald H. Bagley 
and Jesse Dansie to transport free water through the system to the 
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Dansie family was unfair, unjust and erroneous. (H.O. Op. Br. at 
pp. 42-47). Homeowners pointed out that the Public Service 
Commission in its Report and Order dated March 17, 1986 had found 
this Agreement to be "grossly unreasonable" and "showering 
virtually limitless benefits on Jesse Dansie and the members of his 
immediate family." Homeowners also pointed out that it had not 
been a party to this Agreement and to impose its grossly 
unreasonable terms upon them would be unfair and unjust. 
Furthermore, Homeowners argued that the Agreement expired by its 
own terms on April 10, 1987 and no document of renewal in any form 
was presented to the trial court. Finally, Homeowners argued that 
Finding of Fact No. 5, upon which the court's order was based, was 
internally inconsistent and ambiguous (R.1622). 
Foothills responded to these arguments with less than a half 
a page in its brief (Cons. In. Br. of Foothills W.C., at pg. 43). 
Despite the fact that the Public Service Commission in its March 
17, 1986 Report and Order had ruled that the Agreement was grossly 
unreasonable and ordered Foothills Water Company to obtain its 
approval before entering into any future lease or sales agreement 
for the provision of water to Foothills' service area (R.1079), 
Foothills argues that "[T]he encumbrance was, if anything, 
recognized and validated by the Public Service Commission." This 
statement is simply false! Foothills' refusal to even respond to 
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the argument that the Agreement expired on its face on April 10, 
1987, shows that it simply has no basis upon which it can argue 
that the judge's order be upheld with regard to that Agreement. 
Furthermore, Homeowners argued in its opening brief that the 
court's initial decision to provide a quiet title order to the 
water system to Homeowners but subject to allowing Foothills to 
continue to transport water through the system to customers outside 
of Hi-Country Estates Subdivision Phase I, was clearly erroneous. 
Homeowners argued that no evidence of any kind was presented to the 
lower court to justify this portion of the order. In addition, 
Homeowners argued that no appropriate finding of fact or conclusion 
of law was entered by the court to support this provision, and 
therefore that portion of the order should be vacated upon remand. 
(H.O. Op. Br. at 47-49). 
Foothills simply argues in its Consolidated Initial Brief that 
this issue is moot. However, Homeowners are requesting that this 
Court reverse the lower court's judgment quieting title to the 
water system and water right in Foothills and remand the case with 
instructions to enter a quiet title order in favor of Homeowners. 
Homeowners also ask that this Court invalidate this encumbrance 
requiring Homeowners to allow Foothills to transport water through 
its system to outside customers. Only in this way can the court's 
determination be truly fair and just. Even though an appellate 
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court may reverse a judgment due to any number of reasons, it does 
have the power to review and decide matters which may become 
material when a case is remanded for further proceedings. LeGrand 
Johnson Corp. v. Peterson, supra; Anderson v. Utah County Board of 
County Commissioners, supra. 
It is to be noted that Appellees Bagleys do not even address 
the issues contained in this Point. 
POINT VI 
FOOTHILLST CLAIMS FOR SLANDER OF TITLE WERE 
APPROPRIATELY DISMISSED BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
In its Consolidated Initial Brief, Foothills argues that there 
was "undisputed evidence" that the actions of Homeowners, through 
its president Norman Sims and its agent William Turner, slandered 
the title of Foothills Water Company to the water system and the 
water right. The trial court dismissed these allegations outright. 
In its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law dated October 20, 
1989, and again in its Order on Ownership Issues dated October 20, 
1989, the court states: "The counterclaim by Foothills Water 
Company is hereby dismissed for lack of proof" (R.897, 904). 
The court obviously believed Foothills had failed to present 
sufficient evidence to make out the elements of an action for 
slander of title. In Jack B. Parson Companies v. Nield, 751 P.2d 
1131 (Utah 1988), the Supreme Court stated the elements of slander 
of title as follows: 
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" . . . willful recordation or publication of 
untrue material that is disparaging to 
another's title. . . plaintiff must prove that 
he was specifically injured by the action. . . 
malice is also an element of the cause of 
action. . . such malice. . . requires a 
showing that the wrong was done with the 
intent to injure, vex or annoy. . .". 
751 P.2d at 1134. 
In the instant action, the trial judge ruled that the actions 
taken by the Homeowners Association were appropriate, and found as 
a matter of fact and concluded as a matter of law, that Homeowners 
were entitled to a quiet title order based upon their chain of 
title to the water system and the water right in question. 
Therefore, since truth is an absolute defense to a slander of title 
action (publication of untrue material is required), the court 
properly dismissed the slander of title claims against Homeowners. 
Furthermore, even if it could be shown that the publication in 
question was false, it must be shown that the publication was done 
with malice. There simply was no evidence whatsoever that 
Homeowners and their agents took the actions complained of by 
Foothills with the intent to injure, vex, or annoy Foothills. 
Indeed, all of the evidence and the stipulated facts in the lower 
court demonstrate that Homeowners and their agents undertook all 
actions involved with this case in good faith with an intent to 
prove in court that they were the rightful owners of the water 
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system and the water right in question, which they actually 
succeeded in doing. 
Foothills' burden is to show that the court's findings and 
conclusions with regard to their slander of title claims were 
clearly erroneous. They simply cannot meet this burden on appeal 
with what they have presented to this Court. 
POINT VII 
APPELLEE BAGLEYS' CLAIMS WERE APPROPRIATELY 
DISMISSED BY THE TRIAL COURT. 
Bagleys' Consolidated Initial Brief essentially makes two 
claims which relate directly to Homeowners. The first is that 
Bagley is entitled to recover from Homeowners amounts expended by 
Bagley for capital improvements to the water system and operating 
losses under the principles of quantum meruit. Secondly, Bagley 
argues that it is entitled to recover amounts expended for capital 
improvements and operating losses since it was a resulting or 
constructive trustee of the water system for the benefit of 
Homeowners and its members. Although Bagley makes a third point 
regarding the Association's basis for its claim that it should not 
be required to pay some amount before a quiet title order is 
entered, such argument has been dealt with in previous points in 
this Reply Brief. Finally, Bagleys argue that the lower court 
erred in ordering reimbursement only to Foothills Water Company and 
none to Bagley. Homeowners see this as an issue for cross-appeal 
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between Bagley and Foothills; but to the extent that said argument 
relates to Homeowners, Homeowners have either dealt with it in 
previous points of this Reply Brief, or will deal with it in this 
section. 
While it is true that the lower court concluded as a matter of 
law that "Defendants Foothills Water Company, and/or Bagley and 
Company, by virtue of several legal and equitable principles are 
entitled to reasonable reimbursement for improvements made by them 
to Plaintiff's water system from 1974 to 1985" (R.903), Homeowners 
maintain that it is unclear as to what legal and equitable 
principles the court was referring to. The court never specified 
those principles, but Homeowners is willing accept Bagleyfs 
argument that the main principle in question is that of quantum 
meruit or unjust enrichment. 
It is the position of Homeowners that the court was consistent 
with the conclusion of law referred to above when it further 
concluded as a matter of law that: 
Defendants Gerald H. Bagley and Bagley and 
Company are not entitled to any compensation 
for alleged operating losses and capital 
improvements relating to the subject water 
system or water rights due to the fact that 
said defendants transferred all claims, 
rights, title and interest in said water 
system and water right to defendant J. Rodney 
Dansie by agreement of October 31, 1985; and 
all such claims, rights, title and interest in 
said water system and water right merged with 
those of defendant J. Rodney Dansie and 
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defendant Foothills Water Company as of that 
date. 
(R. 1623). 
Homeowners find it extremely significant that although Bagleys 
make four major points in their brief, they do not even address the 
conclusion of law of the trial judge related above. They do not 
argue that their interests were not merged as the trial court 
ruled, nor do they assign as error that the trial court found their 
interests merged with that of Foothills upon the transfer of the 
water system and the water right to Foothills Water Company! 
Bagleys1 only argument seems to be that the court should have 
awarded them some compensation for their capital improvements and 
operating losses, but it is difficult for Homeowners to respond 
when Bagleys choose not to even address the basis for the court's 
ruling in their opening brief. Perhaps Bagleys are lying in wait 
ready to make their arguments against the court's merger conclusion 
of law once Homeowners has had its one and only opportunity to 
reply to their opening brief. If this is so, Homeowners 
respectfully request that Bagleys not be rewarded for such strategy 
and that their arguments on appeal be summarily dismissed. 
As previously noted, Homeowners, Foothills and Bagleys entered 
into a "Stipulated Statement of Undisputed Facts and Disputed 
Contentions" signed by all attorneys for the parties on September 
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16, 1988. In Finding of Fact Nos. 81 and 82, the parties 
stipulated and agreed to the following: 
81. . . . Eventually, in an effort to satisfy 
part of the obligations to Mr. Dansie for his 
services, Dr. Bagley transferred to Mr. Dansie 
both his stock in Foothills Water Company (the 
company which Dr. Bagley had formed to own and 
operate the water system), and the assets of 
that company and other property. 
82. Exhibits NN and PP are true and accurate 
copies of the documents effecting that 
transfer. 
(R.583). 
Exhibit NN is an agreement made and entered into on October 
31, 1985 by and between J. Rodney Dansie, Gerald H. Bagley, Bagley 
and Company, a partnership, and Jordan Acres, a limited 
partnership, referred to in the agreement collectively as "Bagley", 
and the Foothills Water Company, Inc., a Utah corporation. That 
document is attached as Addendum 2 to this Reply Brief. In that 
agreement, Bagley agrees to sell, transfer, assign and convey to 
Dansie, among other things, ,f[A]ny and all stock in and to the 
Foothills Water Company, Inc., a Utah corporation, free and clear 
of any and all liens and encumbrances"; and ,f[T]he assets listed on 
Exhibit A attached hereto, which Bagley covenants and warrants that 
Foothills presently owns, free and clear of all encumbrances, 
excepting the claims of Dansie" (R.1793). 
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Exhibit A attached to that agreement lists the water tank 
parcel in Lot 67, tank no. 2, associated pipe lines, all easements, 
rights-of-way, and fixtures located within the service area of the 
water company, all easements, rights-of-way, pipe lines, fixtures 
or other equipment or personal property located in the Hi-Country 
Estates Subdivisions, South Oquirrh Subdivision and Beagley Acres 
which is owned by Foothills and relates in any way to its water 
utility business, and water rights application number 33130 (59-
1608) (the Glazier well water right or disputed water right in this 
lawsuit) (R.1799). 
As if to make certain that it was clear to the world that 
Bagley was assigning all of his right, title and interest in the 
disputed water right, and water system serving Hi-Country Estates 
Subdivision Phase I, Dr. Bagley "personally and as the Authorized 
Representative of Jordan Acres" produced and signed a document 
entitled "Assignment" which was Exhibit PP to the Stipulated 
Statement of Undisputed Facts and Disputed Contentions (Addendum 
3). This additional Assignment makes clear that Dr. Bagley as an 
individual as well as Jordan Acres as a limited partnership through 
its agent, Dr. Bagley, assigned to Foothills Water Company "all 
right, title and interest in any and all water rights, equipment, 
easements, rights-of-way or property they have or may have in or to 
or associated with the water system located generally in the Hi-
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Country Estates Subdivision, Phase I, which said water system is 
presently owned, operated and managed by the Foothills Water 
Company." This Assignment was dated January 17, 1986 (R.1801). 
Since the parties had stipulated that these exhibits were true 
and correct copies of the documents in question, and since the 
parties had stipulated that these documents were to be included as 
part of the Stipulated Statement of Undisputed Facts and Disputed 
Contentions, the court adopted these documents as part of its 
Findings of Fact entered October 20, 1989 (R.901, para. 1). 
Furthermore, consistent with the aforementioned finding of 
fact, the court made an additional finding of fact as part of its 
Order of October 31, 1990 in which it found: 
8. Defendants Bagley and Company and Gerald 
H. Bagley transferred all their respective 
claims, rights, title and interest in 
Foothills Water Company and the subject water 
system and water right to Defendant J. Rodney 
Dansie by agreement between the parties dated 
October 31, 1985. 
(R.1623). 
As a result of these findings of fact, the court adopted this 
previously cited conclusion of law in its October 31, 1990 Order: 
1. Defendants Gerald H. Bagley and Bagley and 
Company are not entitled to any compensation 
for alleged operating losses and capital 
improvements relating to the subject water 
system or water right due to the fact that 
said Defendants transferred all claims, 
rights, title and interest in said water 
system and water right to Defendant J. Rodney 
Dansie by agreement of October 31, 1985; and 
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all such claims, rights, title and interest in 
said water system and water right merged with 
those of Defendant J. Rodney Dansie and 
Defendant Foothills Water Company as of that 
date. 
(R.1623). 
There simply can be no question that Appellees Bagleys have 
failed to establish that the court's findings of fact referred to 
above are clearly erroneous. This is true in light of the fact 
that they stipulated and agreed to the underlying documents and 
facts which led to the court's Findings of Facts. Furthermore, 
since Appellees Bagleys do not challenge the Conclusion of Law No. 
1 in their Consolidated Initial Brief, it can only be presumed that 
they are unable to demonstrate to the Court that this conclusion of 
law is not legally correct. 
In fact, the court's conclusion of law is legally correct. It 
should not require citation to authority for one to advocate the 
proposition that a contract and assignment stating that the 
assignors assign all right, title and interest in certain property 
is valid and legal under Utah law. No party in this case has ever 
raised an issue with regard to any alleged invalidity of the 
agreement or assignment stipulated to by all the parties as being 
valid and legal; and therefore the court may assume that the 
parties had the capacity to contract and that the contracts and 
assignments in question are legal and valid. 
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Nevertheless, if some authority is needed, counsel would cite 
to the Court the case of Wiscorn v. Lockhart Company, 608 P.2d 236 
(Utah 1980), in which the Supreme Court declared that the 
fundamental law of assignment is that the assignee takes nothing 
more by his assignment than his assignor had. 608 P.2d at 238. 
While it is Foothills' contention and the court's Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law that Appellees Bagleys had divested 
themselves of all interest in the water system and water right in 
question sometime prior to the agreements and assignments here (see 
Judge Brian's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law referred to 
earlier, R.899-904), as between Foothills and Bagley it may be 
presumed that Bagleys transferred all their right, title and 
interest (whatever it may be) to Foothills. Foothills thus becomes 
their successor-in-interest and any claims or rights possessed by 
Bagleys were assigned to Foothills. Tanner v. Lawler, 6 Utah.2d 
84, 305 P.2d 882 (1957). 
Thus it may be presumed that the court determined as a matter 
of law that the claims of Bagleys to reimbursement for capital 
improvements and net operating losses were asserted in the trial of 
this matter by Bagleys' successor-in-interest Foothills Water 
Company (R.1623), and therefore the court ordered Homeowners to pay 
the sum of $98,500.00 to Foothills in satisfaction of all such 
claims. 
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Homeowners will not reply to the arguments made by Appellees 
Bagley further other than to say that their arguments that they 
deserve reimbursement overlook the testimony of Dr. Gerald Bagley 
in his deposition referred to previously in which he admitted that 
the value of the water system was recovered from the sale of the 
lots (R.1650 pp. 29-30). Furthermore/ even though Bagley operated 
illegally as an uncertificated public utility prior to 1986, he was 
assessing and collecting fees from each of the lot owners of Hi-
Country Estates Subdivision, Phase I, ostensibly to cover his 
operating expenses (R.580). 
Homeowners respectfully request that the claims of Bagleys be 
dismissed and that whatever decisions the Court makes with regard 
to the other issues in this lawsuit, the Court clearly affirms the 
lower court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law relating to 
Appellees Bagleys1 assignment, transfer and merger of their claims 
with those of J. Rodney Dansie and Appellee Foothills Water Company 
as of the date of the agreements aforementioned. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant Hi-Country Estates Homeowners Association 
respectfully requests that the quiet title order issued by the 
lower court be set aside and remanded to the lower court with 
instructions for the court to enter a quiet title order in favor of 
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Homeowners. In the alternative, Homeowners request that the 
court's judgment and order quieting title in Foothills be reversed 
and the case be remanded for a new trial, or such other proceedings 
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as this Honorable Court feels is appropriate in the premises. 
16 day of DATED this 1992. 
2LLER, 
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and J. Rodney Dansie 
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Ralph J. Marsh 
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ADDENDUM 1 
Independent Forensic Laboratories 
S 1 8 S ESPAORILLE DRIVE, SALT LAKE CITY. U T A H 84116 
GBOmGE J. THROCKMORTON CBOI) 3 6 8 - 6 8 5 6 
DIRECTOR August 30, 1988 iecn)5«e-7326 
Robert A. Bentley 
Attorney at Law 
50 West Broadway, 10th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Dear Mr. Bentley, re: Hi-Country Estates 
This report pertains to my examination of the following documents as per 
your request: 
Writing in Question: 
A copy of a nine page "Agreement" dated 22 Way 74. This appears to be a 
reduced-size copy that had originally been on legal size paper but was 
reduced to accomodate a 8x11 inch photo-copy process. The handwritten 
notation "#31" appears on the bottom right hand portion of page 1. 
An examination was conducted on this typed agreement to determine if there 
were indications of alterations, deletions, interlineations, obliterations, 
or anything else suspicious in nature. 
There were certain limitations imposed by the examination of this document 
because it was a "reduced-size copy" of an original. Several important and 
significant tests which specificially relate to authenticity can not be 
conducted on copies. Although many tests and observations were made on 
this "copy" it is still preferred that the original be obtained and 
submitted for examination if possible. 
However, in spite of these limitations I made the following observations in 
connection with my examination of this document: 
I. Several typewriters were used to type this document. The bulk of 
the document was typed with one typewriter. A second typewriter was used 
to type the bottom paragraph of page #1. A third typewriter was used to 
type page #9. It is possible, but could not be verified, that a 4th and/or 
5th typewriter was used to make the following insertions: 
a. Page 1: top paragraph, the name "GERALD H. BAGLEY" 
b. Page 6: paragraph 14 beginning "or Buyer to enforce..." and 
ending with "...reasonable attorneys fees." 
c. Page 6: paragraph 16, the final portion which states "...after 
five (5) days written notice, may either:" 
II. Certain individual and distinct characteristics called "trash 
marks" were observed on the document. These trash marks indicate that page 
6 and 9 were photo-copied on a different machine than was used to copy the 
other 7 pages. 
Robert A. Bentley 
8-30-88. 
page 2. . . 
III. The author of the handwriting on page 2 was different than the 
author of the handwriting on page 9. 
IV. The final paragraph of page 9, which states "All right, title and 
interest in and to the water system and equipment serving Hi-Country 
Estates." was typed at a different time than the rest of the page. 
On Friday August 26, 1988 I met with Attorney Marsh and receiv/ed from him a 
full size copy of a similar agreement as previously described. I briefly 
examined the thermofax copy in his possession and was allowed to take a 
copy of his copy with me for further examination. This copy had a 
handwritten #5 in the upper left hand corner. Henseforth I will refer to 
Marsh's copy as copy #5 and Bentley!s copy as copy #31. 
My examination and comparison of copy #5 and #31 revealed the following 
information: 
1. Copies #5 and #31 were not copied from the same source. It appears 
like there was a master document somewhere, and copies were made from this 
master. Copies made from this master are called "first-generation" copies. 
At least two different "first-generation" copies were made and the bottom 
paragraph on page 1 was typed in separately on each of two copies. #5 and 
#31 were typed at different times, but it appears they were typed on a 
similar typewriter. 
2. Pages 6 and 9 were probably similarily copied from a similar first-
generation source, but the remaining seven pages of these two sets were 
copied from separate sources, or on different machines. 
3. The handwritten serial number on page 2 is different on each of 
these two copies. 
SUMMARY: 
There are many inconsistencies found within and between these two 
documents. There are first, second, and possibly third generation copies 
that were examined. Neither set of pages is consistent within itself or 
each other. Different typewriters, and additions found within the text of 
the document are suspicious in and of itself. 
It is possible to make all types of alterations and changes to a document 
that can effectively be covered up through using techniques involving the 
photo-copy process. The photo-copy process also tends to hide certain 
distinct and unique characteristic traits that can be used to authenticate 
a document. 
Robert A, Bentley 
8-30-88 
page 3••• 
Because of these and other limitations I was unable to make as complete and 
thorough an examination as desired but, I hope the observations made will 
be of value to you. If I may be of further assistance, please give me a 








THIS AGREEMENT made and entered into this ^ 5/4z2fr1day of 
October, 1985, by and between J. RODNEY DANSIE, an individual, 
hereinafter referred to as "Dansie", GERALD H. BAGLEY, BAGLEY & 
COMPANY, a partnership, and JORDAN ACRES, a limited partner-
ship, hereinafter collectively referred to as "Bagley"# and THE 
•FOOTHILLS WATER COMPANY, INC., a Utah corporation, hereinafter 
referred to as "Foothills". 
RECITALS: 
A. On or before December 1, 1982, Dansie contracted 
with Bagley and/or Foothills to provide work and/or materials 
for the repair and maintenance of the Foothills water system, 
and pursuant to said contract, Dansie provided services and 
materials during the period beginning December 1, 1982, and 
continuing through October 8, 1984, with respect to that 
certain Foothills water utility system located on that certain 
real property located in the Hi-Country Estates Subdivision in 
Salt Lake County, Utah. 
B. Dansie has been paid for a portion of the 
materials and labor provided, but claims an additional amount 
totaling $80,447.43. 
C. On October 10, 1984, October 12, 1984, 
December 5, 1984, and January 21, 1985, Dansie filed Notices of 
Liens with the Salt Lake County Recorders Office, with respect 
to certain property owned by Bagley and Foothills, evidencing 
the amount owed and outstanding pursuant to the materials and 
services provided. 
D. On October 7, 1985, Dansie filed a complaint 
against Bagley, Foothills and others in the Third Judicial 
District Court of Salt Lake County for the amounts owed and 
outstanding, and for other relief (the "Action"). 
E. Dansie performed additional work and labor after 
October 8, 1984, through and including October 5, 1985, and has 
filed an additional Notice of Lien to secure the amounts owed 
for said additional work and labor, which said additional 
amount is $49,043.00. 
F. The parties hereto now desire to reach a certain 
understanding with respect to the Action, the additional Notice 
of Lien and amounts owed by Bagley and Foothills to Dansie, in 
accordance with the terms set forth hereinafter. 
NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual cove-
nants and conditions hereinafter recited, and for other good 
and valuable consideration, the receipt and adequacy of which 
are hereby acknowledged, the parties hereto agfee as follows: 
!• Bagley. Bagley agrees to sell, transfer, assign 
and convey to Dansie the following property owned by Bagley: 
(a) Northwest quarter of the Southwest quarter 
of the Southwest quarter of Section 5, Township 4 South, Range 
2 West, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, located in Salt Lake 
County, Utah, which property shall be free and clear of any and 
all liens and encumbrances affecting said property, excepting 
liens and encumbrances filed by Dansie with respect to said 
property, if any, to be conveyed by Warranty Deed; and 
(b) Lot 43 of that certain Hi-Country Estates 
Subdivision, Phase No* 1, located in Salt Lake County, Utah, to 
be conveyed by Warranty Deed; 
(c) Any and all stock in and to The Foothills 
Water Company, Inc., a Utah corporation, free and clear of any 
and all liens and encumbrances. 
(d) The assets listed on Exhibit "A* attached 
hereto, which Bagley covenants and warrants that Foothills 
presently owns, free and clear of all encumbrances, excepting 
the claims of Dansie. 
2. Foothills. Foothills agrees to deliver to Dansie 
the following: 
(a) Evidence of all assets of Foothills, 
together with any and all records, books, corporate documents 
or other papers relevant in any way to the company, its opera-
tions, customers, creditors, receivables, authorization to do 
business, corporate status and any other matters in any way 
associated with the business of the company; and 
(b) Evidence of any and all interests, rights or 
other properties owned by the company, including rights 
pursuant to contracts, permits, statutory or regulatory law, 
water rights and other properties, assets or interests whatso-
ever owned by the company, or to which the company has rights 
or interests of any sort whatsoever. 
3. Dansie. Tn consideration of the property and 
assets assigned, transferred and/or conveyed to Dansie pursuant 
to paragraph 1 and the evidence and information provided 
pursuant to paragraph 2 hereof, Dansie hereby covenants that 
following closing (as defined hereafter), Dansie will hold 
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Bagley, Foothills and the principals of Foothills harmless from 
liability for any claim, demand, action or cause of action for 
damages, costs, expenses or compensation due Dansie arising out 
of or associated with the claims described in the Action filed 
by Dansie on October 7, 1985, in the Third Judicial District 
Court of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, and with respect to 
the additional Notice of Lien filed by Dansie. Dansie further 
.covenants to perform all services and to take all actions to 
legally and properly operate the water system of Foothills and 
to hold Bagley, Foothills and the principals of Foothills 
harmless from all claims and obligations with respect thereto 
arising after the date of closing. 
4. Reservation of Rights. Dansie expressly reserves 
any and all other rights of action, claims or demands Dansie 
has or may have against any and all other persons arising out 
of or in any way associated with the claims asserted and sought 
by Dansie in the Action, including the right to continue to 
foreclose said liens against any and all other parties assert-
ing right in and to the property on which Dansie has filed said 
liens. 
5. Closing. Dansie's covenants pursuant to this 
Agreement shall become effective on the date of closing, at 
which time Bagley and Foothills shall sell, assign, transfer, 
convey and/or deliver to Dansie the property and items 
described in paragraphs 1 and 2 hereof. Closing shall occur 
not later than November 15, 1985, at a place agreeable to the 
parties hereto. 
(a) At closing, Bagley and Foothills shall 
deliver and present such documents, instruments, deeds, papers 
and other items as may be necessary to convey, transfer and/or 
assign to Dansie the property and items described in para-
graphs 1 and 2 hereof. In addition, Bagley shall provide title 
insurance to the property to be conveyed pursuant to paragraph 
1(a) hereof, and paragraph 2 of Exhibit "A*, in the amount of 
$75,000 insuring title to said properties free and clear of any 
and all liens and encumbrances, except the Notices of Liens 
filed by Dansie. 
(b) Dansie shall deliver such other documents, 
instruments, pleadings, releases and/or papers as shall be 
necessary to formalize his agreement to hold Bagley and 
Foothills harmless of and from any and all claims he has sought 
in the Action. 
6. Additional Documentation, The parties hereto 
agree to execute any and all documents, instruments and/or 
papers as may be necessary to satisfy the purposes of this 
Agreement. 
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7. Binding Agreement. This Agreement shall inure 
the benefit of the parties hereto and any heirs and le 
representatives or successors in interest of the parties herei 
8. Controlling Law. This Agreement shall 
construed in accordance with the laws of the State of Utah. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have caus 
their names or the names of their duly authorized officers 
be signed hereunder the day A-nd yea* £irst afcove written, 
BAGLEY & COMPANY, a partnership, 
JORDAN ACRES, a limited 
partnership, 
Gerald H. Bagley, Ger^ral^^artnei 
THE FOOTHILLS WATER COMPANY, INC., 
a Utah corporation, 
-4-
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
ss. 
On the .3-/ day of October, 1985, personally appeared 
before me J, RODNEY DANSIE, the signer of the above instrument, 




My Commission Expires: 
(Pe>Z> /*. J<?f7 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
On the 
appeared before me GERALD H. BAGLEY, the signer of the above 
instrument, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the 
same. 
ss. 
day of October, 1985, personally 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission Expires: 
Residing ^.x^JCZ/TJ^ie,^ LU& 
GI736 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the %3J&& day oL October, '1985, personally 
appeared before me Jk^£t^^ partner of BAGLEY & 
COMPANY, a partnership, tl^signeif^f^he above instrument, who 
duly acknowledged to me that he execoted the same on behalf of 
and by authority of said partnership. 
My Commission Expires: 
, <-zE&s 
NOTARY PUBLIC ~J? -^ O"& /2 -¥ 
Residing at: ^ ^ ^ P ^ A P ^ L^jf 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
On the day of October, 1985, personally 
appeared before me GERALD H. BAGLEY, General Partner of JORDAN 
ACRES, a limited partnership, the signer of the above instru-
ment, who duly acknowledged to me that he executed the same on 
behalf of and by authority of said partnership. 
NOTARY PUBLIC /? ^p^ 
Residing a t ^ ^ ^ g ^ ^ % ^ f g ^ 
My Commission Expires: 
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STATE OF UTAH ) 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
SS. 
On the ^£z£r day 06 October, '1985, personally 
appeared before me S^^^*-^^^-^f^^i JihQ being by me duly 
sworn, did say that he is the /)'&*J',s&>~-^ of THE FOOTHILLS 
JJATER COMPANY, INC., a Utah corporation, and that said instru-
ment was signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of 
its bylaws or of a^ tfesoliition of its board of directors and 
said _^ZJZyi^xJ2££^/Lu^^J^ duly acknowledged to me that said 









Accounts Receivable of $ as of ,the day of 
Octoberf 1985. 
Water Tank parcel (Lot 67) 
Beginning at the Northeast corner of Lot 67, Hi-Country 
Estates Subdivision, said point is also North 89°42f24* 
West along the section line 1028.38 feet and South 
50*Q0f00" East 784.22 feet from the Northeast corner of 
Section 5, Township 4 South, Range 2 East, Salt Lake Base 
and Meridian; and running thence Southwesterly 67.73 feet 
along the arc of a curve to the right through a central 
angle of 4°47l28", the radius point of which is North 
80°00,00" West 810.00 feet; thence North 50°00f00' West 
231.38 feet; thence North 40°Q0,00* East 60.00 feet; thence 
South 50p00,00' East 200.00 feet to the point of 
beginning. Contains 12,973.56 square feet or 0.2978 acres. 
Tank No. 2, associated pipelines, all easements, rights of 
way, and fixtures located on the NW 1/4 of the SW 1/4 of 
the SW 1/4 of S 5, T4S R2W SLB&M. 
All easements, rights of way, pipelines, fixtures or other 
equipment or personal property located in the Hi-Country 
Estates Subdivisions, South Oquirrh Subdivision and Beagley 
Acres which is owned by Foothills and relates in any way to 
its water utility business. 





„s „ -ndividual, and Jordan 
Dr. Gerald 
^hrouah authorized agent, UL. 
• u*. fit-ie and 1 nteresi -* * 
y t h e y h a v e o r m a y 
-enl, easement, -xghts *., 
iated with the water system 
have • • -~„ Phase # which 
*„„ Frtat-ps Subdivision, Pnase , 
,,„ the Hi-Country " L a L t - J generally tne «^ naged by <c nresently owned, operate system is presenuxj 
the Foothills Water Company. 
„~ ^ „ 17 ^Bav of January i 1,:>86. 
DATED this / / — aaJ 
lERALD 
and as the Author 1 






STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Dr. Gerald . Bagley personal ly appeared before me 
t h i s / ^ d a y oi JiiMiiiai y „ 1986 and acknowledged to me t h a t he i s 
an agent of Jordan Acres authorized execute t h i s document 




My Commission Expires: 
01891 
ADDENDUM 4 
}' H 0 C £ h I) J N G S 
THE COURT: The Court, having previously listened to 
proffered i.es t i niony, sworn testimony, having considered 
numerous documents and exhibits,, having listened to argument 
ansei, having considered carefully all of the documents 
submitted in counoitjon with this matter,» rules as fo] lows: 
The Court makes the following fundings of fact. The 1974 
agret'mMnt between Hi-Countrv Estates Second and Bagley and 
Company was only an agreement uw convey riqht, title and 
interest m the disputed water system, ami not a deed or legal 
document < it « onveyance. 
Two, the , »*• nent did not convey legal right, 
t it le or interest the disputed water system to Bagley and 
ompany from Hi C * Estates Second HJ-Country Estates, 
inc held righ1", title and lnt^ t-psi in the disputed water 
system. 
Three, Plaintiff, Hi-Country Homeowners1 
Association, obtained legal right title and interest in the 
disputed wcMer system from the following sources: Ar i'wo i9/5 
quitclaim deeds from Hi-Country Estates, Inc., and Hi-Country 
Estates Second, to Plaintiff, Hi-Country Hompowners1 
Association, iliose deeds conveying all common areas in the 
Hi-Gountry Estates subdivision to plaintiff homeowners, 
B, a 1984 recorded tax deed from Salt Lake County to 
Plaintiffs, conveying all the water tank lots In the disputed 
1 
1 subdivision to Plaintiffs. 
2 C, a 1985 recorded deed from Hi-Country Estates, 
3 Inc., to Plaintiffs, conveying the water tank lots to 
4 Plaintiffs. 
5 D, a 1985 recorded deed from Hi-Country Estates 
6 Second to Plaintiffs, conveying the water tank lots to 
7 Plaintiffs. 
8 E, two 1985 recorded quitclaim deeds from Zions Bank 
9 and Trust, trustee for the property in Hi-Country Estates 
10 subdivision, to Plaintiffs, conveying the water tank lots to 
11 Plaintiffs. 
12 F, an assignment from Hi-Country Estates, Inc., to 
13 Plaintiffs, of the disputed water rights. 
14 6, an acknowledgement by the State Engineer's 
15 Division of Water Rights that the plaintiffs are owners of the 
16 water rights, more specifically the Pleasure well water 
17 rights. 
18 Based on the findings, the Court rules as follows: 
19 Plaintiff is the legal owner of the disputed water system, 
20 which includes the water rights, the water lots, the water 
21 tanks, and the water lines. Defendant Bagley and Company, by 
22 virtue of several legal and equitable principles, is entitled 
23 to reasonable reimbursement for improvements made by Defendant 
24 to Plaintiff's water system from 1974 to 1985. An evidentiary 
25 hearing is ordered to establish the amount of reimbursement 
due to Defendant from Plaintiffs n,o counterclaim by 
Foot:*! i i • Li Water Company is dismissed for lack " an 
order quieting t „i t ,"i -.• to the water system ; ; i " i ^ f 
Plaintiffs, will issue only upon payment by Plaintiffs 
+t - the Court's reimbursement order for 
improvements by the Iteieudant in the Plaintiffs' water system 
ror the years 1974 tin \9uh 
Plaintiff will prepare specific findings of fact, 
conclusions of law and a court order, consistent with -e 
rilinq ol the Court All documents are to be ::*r\ --^  *o this 
court for signatur - filing with the Clerk of the Court on 
or before November <•-,*•• T? ni 
A little unasked for advice. You may be far, far 
ahead, in terms of costs i m e competing interests 
were to meet, and in an attitude c. compromise determine, by 
stipulation, what is fair and reasonable in terms of 
compensation to the defendant for improvements made to the 
water system. If you are unable to do that, the Court will 
schedule an evidentiar -. m g , take testimony, and make the 
decision on the raattei appears that good judgment and 
common sensp dictates that a* this point the question of 
reasonable reimbursement determined by the parties. 
MR. ANTCZAK . ,u thing, ** 
there a chan e t« :- ^f^ extension on the findings 
of fact? 1 will - . * the week preceding 
3 
that. 
THE COURT: On business or pleasure? 
MR. ANTCZAK: On business, I am afraid, though it is 
in Hawaii. I am told I can have no fun while I am there. 
THE COURT: I understand. The Court is not going to 
interfere with any pleasurable business trip. When would you 
like it? 
MR. ANTCZAK: One week would be just fine, your 
Honor. 
THE COURT: The findings of fact, conclusions of law 
and the order consistent with the ruling of the Court are to 
be submitted on or before 12 noon, November 11, 1988. Will 
that give you enough time for your business trip? 
MR. ANTCZAK: I am sure it would. 
MR. BENTLEY: I assumed I would have the 
responsibility, as Plaintiffs1 Counsel, to prepare those, 
THE COURT: You prepare them. Apparently Counsel 
wants to review them. 
MR. BENTLEY: So those should be to him by the 11th? 
And then I assume you would have reasonable time for 
objections? 
THE COURT: They should be to him in time for 
Counsel to review them and have them submitted to this court 
on or before November 11 at 12 noon. 







addressed, such as the counterclaims, attorney s le.-:^  other 
issues. Are those to be i eserved? 
THE COURT: The Court is go a ng t:i LaKt under 
advisement: a 1 1 other issues, with the hope that at th is point 
those matters will be resolved with the umbrella issue of 
i easonable reimbursement, If not at a fut lire hearing, the 
Court will resolve those matters. Does that cause anyone any 
heartburn? 
MR fcNTCZAK: Sounds fine, your Honor. 
MR. BENTLE'Y : That' s f ine . 
THE COURT: The Court will d< :> ::i t , HI that basis, To 
make sure, matter does not slip in the cracks, t:i: le Court. 
on its own, motion, will 1 se t t :i le matter for an evidentiary 
hear: g November 22, 1988, 10:00 a.m this court. If the 
matter is resolved by stipulation, the Court would appreciate 
notice at the earliest possible ;.* • cnat tr. - * matter can 
be suucbcen, and other matters waiting in the w.; ..;- - be. 
inserted into that t:i me spai : e . 
MR BENTLEY: We have a number c >f documents that are 
going to neea tr be examined, your Honor, With that sort of 
time frame, there obviously isi i1"11 room for discovery I 
wont ien if it might be appropriate to give us a nrenear Lug 
conference date or discovery cutoff date to exchange documents 
tnat are going to be used? We havf U F W r seen any of the 
document.;.:* niaf would be used to support these capital 
improvements. 
THE COURT: It is probably not going to take you 
long to prepare them and submit them, is it? 
MR. ANTCZAK: I don!t believe so, your Honor. I 
frankly will have to — Mr. Marsh's client has many of those 
documents. We need to work in conjunction with him. 
Obviously Mr. Marsh is not here today. 
THE COURT: The Court is concerned that the matter 
move with dispatch. The November date will remain in place. 
If it appears that after due diligence that just is not a 
realistic date to complete the preparation for either 
compromise or the evidentiary hearing, notify the Court, and 
the Court will be understanding. 
MR. BENTLEY: Can we have an earlier date that is a 
cutoff to introduce all exhibits that are going to be used, so 
we can have a chance to look at them to determine if we need 
expert testimony at the hearing? I don't know what we are 
going to be faced with. If we had ten or 15 days prior to 
that hearing an idea of all the exhibits, the breadth of the 
testimony, who that was going to come from, it would be far 
easier for us to prepare for an expedited hearing. 
MR. ANTCZAK: We will attempt to put it together as 
expeditiously as we can. But, as I indicate, we do need to 
coordinate with Mr. Marsh and his client. Many of the 
documents are under his control. I can't make a commitment to 
6 
1 the Court ox Mr, Bentley I oda^ on 'h=it issue* 
2 THE COURT: Today is Octobei ;5. The Court- t«y way 
3 of suggestion, did n t order, suggests that all do uirents be 
<- provided to counsel for the plaintiff on or before 12 noon, 
t November I" tven It you are out of t mn i ounsel, maybe 
1
 others who are intimaft Jith the documents could begin the 
process of assembling them, 
t (Tin* proceeding was concluded.) 
